Once again, there is talk of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas—one that could bring home the remaining 50 hostages and effectively end the nearly 21-month-long war with the terrorist organization.
American pressure appears to be mounting following the 12-day war against Iran, which ended in a ceasefire, with growing calls now for Israel to withdraw from Gaza as well. US President Donald Trump posted on his Truth Social channel on Sunday in all caps: “MAKE THE DEAL IN GAZA. GET THE HOSTAGES BACK!!!”
Reports indicate that Israel’s Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer will head to Washington today, followed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the coming weeks, to push the negotiations forward. Still, previous claims that a deal was imminent have unraveled at the last moment.
Complicating matters is the fact that Hamas remains in power in the Gaza Strip. This means at least two of the war’s central objectives—eradicating Hamas militarily and politically—remain unmet. A larger question looms. If Israel was able to accomplish its objectives in battles against Hezbollah and Iran swiftly, what went wrong in Gaza?
According to experts, several factors are at play. Here are seven key differences between the war in Gaza and the other conflicts Israel has fought in recent months and years.
No. 1: More than just military goals
One of the stated aims of the war in Gaza is the destruction of both the military and civilian wings of Hamas. This stands in contrast to Israel’s more narrowly defined objectives in its recent campaigns against Hezbollah and Iran.
According to Adi Schwartz of the Misgav Institute, “this goal is much wider” than those in Lebanon or Iran, focused solely on military targets. In Gaza, Israel set out to dismantle an entire governing infrastructure, military and political alike.
To a degree, Israel has succeeded in weakening Hamas and pushing back its terrorist operations, similar to what it achieved with Hezbollah and Iran’s nuclear capabilities. However, unlike in those cases, Hamas remains in control of the population in the strip.
No. 2: October 7 changed everything
Since October 7, 2023, Israelis have better understood the actual threat posed by Hamas. On that day, more than 6,000 residents of the Gaza Strip—slightly more than half of them Hamas terrorists—breached the Israeli border, murdered 1,200 people, and kidnapped 251 others. Thousands more were injured.
Unlike in Israel’s other recent battles, the attack on October 7 made this war deeply personal and existential. “It is an all-out war,” Schwartz said.
This is not simply about revenge. Israelis—especially those living in the south—cannot resume their lives with any sense of security until they are convinced that Hamas cannot regroup and launch another attack. The weight of October 7 still hangs heavily on the national psyche.
No. 3: The hostage dilemma
From day one, Israel has had to operate under significant constraints due to the hostages being held in Gaza. “There were certain neighborhoods and certain cities that Israel was very careful not to attack or bomb, because the IDF believed the hostages were being held there,” Schwartz said.
“If you and I know that, obviously, Hamas also knew it. Meaning, they could cling on to those hostages and have these areas where they could continue fighting.” Schwartz referred to the hostages as a kind of “security blanket” for the terrorist organization.
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Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi of the Israel Defense and Security Forum agreed. He said that there has been ongoing tension between two central goals: bringing the hostages home and eradicating Hamas. At times, he said, these objectives were in direct conflict, exactly for the reasons Schwartz described.
Still, Avivi said that if a temporary ceasefire could bring home as many hostages as possible, Israel should take that opportunity—even if it prolongs the military mission against Hamas, so long as that goal is preserved.
“The idea would be that the army stays in position, we don’t retreat,” Avivi explained. “We have a ceasefire and then continue. If we retreat and they regroup in the areas we already conquered, that is a problem."
No. 4: Tunnels, tunnels, tunnels
Fighting Hamas is fundamentally different from conducting airstrikes on Iran or even launching a ground invasion against Hezbollah. One primary reason is Hamas’ elaborate and extensive tunnel system.
The group has constructed more than 200 miles of underground tunnels—many reinforced with concrete and iron—creating a hidden battlefield that has significantly complicated Israel’s operations.
Avivi explained that these tunnels have been used for multiple purposes: to hide hostages, to store hundreds of rockets, RPGs, and explosive devices, and to provide cover for Hamas fighters.
The tunnels have also neutralized many of the Israeli military’s battlefield advantages, such as superior intelligence gathering, precision airstrikes, and advanced armored combat units. The enemy has literally gone underground, making it harder to target and defeat.
No. 5: No state, no rules
Another challenge in Gaza is the absence of any legitimate partner. In Lebanon, while about a third of the population is Shiite and supportive of Hezbollah, another third is Christian, and another third is Sunni Muslim. This diversity allows for some level of internal political balancing.
“There is a government in Lebanon that tries,” Schwartz said. “We don’t yet know whether or not they’re going to be successful, but at least you have someone to work with inside Lebanon to try to curb Hezbollah’s operations.”
In contrast, Gaza offers no such opportunity. “In the Gaza Strip, you have almost 100% of the population that is pro-Hamas or at least shares Hamas ideology,” Schwartz explained. Moreover, unlike Lebanon or Iran, Israel is not fighting a state—it is fighting a coastal enclave ruled by a terrorist entity that does not abide by the rules of war.
“There’s a great difference between a war against a state and a war against a terror organization,” said Harel Chorev, a senior researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center. “From the very beginning, people were mistaken to compare the 1973 Yom Kippur War or the Six-Day War with the war in Gaza. This is not a conventional war with tanks against tanks or infantry against infantry.”
No. 6: Double standards?
Schwartz argued that Israel has been held to a different standard than other nations in its war against the Palestinians in Gaza—forced to provide food, water, and electricity to an area controlled by a terrorist organization, thereby inadvertently sustaining Hamas.
“Israel, other than any other country in the world, has been required to supply the enemy,” Schwartz stressed. “Israel is under tremendous pressure to provide aid and prolong the war. Putting a siege on an area is a classic and legitimate tool of war.”
“I have never heard of an army or a country that is trying to win a war and at the same time providing these supplies to the enemy,” Schwartz said.
He added that instead of giving in to international pressure, Israel should have implemented a clearer policy. Civilians wishing to surrender could have been safely relocated to a designated humanitarian zone in the southern Gaza Strip, where they would have received food, water, and shelter. The remaining territory, he suggested, could have been declared a war zone without such constraints.
According to Schwartz, the failure to manage this situation effectively stemmed from two factors: relentless international pressure and the Israeli military's lack of a concrete plan to handle such a scenario.
No. 7: A War on multiple fronts
From the outset, Israel was pulled in multiple directions. Either the American administration imposed heavy constraints on the military, or it was required to divert resources to fight other enemies.
From the first rocket launched by Hezbollah on October 8, 2023, the army had to deploy large numbers of soldiers to the northern border and ultimately engage in combat in Lebanon. Soon after, the fall of the Assad regime created instability on the Syrian border, requiring additional forces. And then came new threats from the Houthis and Iran, drawing further attention and resources.
“For the first time in this war, the full center of gravity is going to Gaza,” Avivi said. “I think the fact that the IDF managed to neutralize the axes—Hezbollah, Syria, Iran, Iraq, the Houthis are all very weakened—we can really focus on Gaza now.” In this new reality, Avivi said, “We will be able to achieve the mission. There is nothing we cannot do once we put our minds to it,” he continued. And the experts agree: Winning is the only option.
Chorev said that no one will be willing to live in the Gaza envelope communities if Hamas is not eliminated. Moreover, leaving Hamas in power would pose a danger not only to Israel but to the entire region, both Schwartz and Avivi stressed.
“Any scenario that leaves Hamas in the Gaza Strip is a disaster,” Schwartz said. “The message would be devastating: That you can be a radical, Muslim Brotherhood, jihadist terror organization—even a small and weak one—and wage war against one of the strongest actors in the Middle East—and survive. ... We cannot let it happen.”